Two fish that jointly approach a predator in order to inspect it share the deadly risk of capture depending on the distance between them. Models are developed that seek ESS inspection distances of both single prey and pairs, based on experimental data of the risk that prey (sticklebacks) incur when they approach a predator (pike) to varying distances. Our analysis suggests that an optimal inspection distance can exist for a single fish, and for two equal fish behaving entirely cooperatively so as to maximize the fitness of the pair. Two equal fish inspecting cooperatively should inspect at an equal distance from the predator. The optimal distance is much closer to the predator for cooperative pairs than for single inspectors. However, optimal inspection for two equal fish behaving cooperatively operates across a rather narrow band of conditions relating to the benefits of cooperation. Evolutionarily stable inspection can also exist for two equal fish behaving non-cooperatively such that each acts to make a best reply (in terms of its personal fitness) to its opponent's strategy. Non-cooperative pairs should also inspect at equal distance from the pike. Unlike the 'single fish' and 'cooperative' optima, which are unique inspection distances, there exists a range of ESS inspection distances. If either fish chooses to move to any point in this zone, the best reply of its opponent is to match it (move exactly alongside). Unilateral forward movement in the 'match zone' may not be possible without some cooperation, but if the pair can 'agree' to move forward synchronously, maintaining equal distance, inspection will occur at the nearest point in this zone to the predator. This 'near threshold' is an ESS and is closer to the predator than the single fish optimum-pairs behaving almost selfishly can thus attain greater benefits from inspection by the protection gained from Hamilton's dilution effect. That pairs should inspect more closely than single fish conforms with empirical findings. Phenotypic asymmetries in costs and benefits between the fish are not yet included in the model.
INTRODUCTION
Small fish often leave the safety of their shoal and approach a detected predator in order to inspect it (Pitcher et al. 1986; Magurran & Pitcher 1987; Magurran 1990; Pitcher 1992) . Usually singletons, pairs or small groups carry out repeatedly such predator inspection visits (Magurran & Pitcher 1987) . Correlational evidence (Dugatkin 1992 ) and the observation that inspectors avoid the predator's 'attack cone' (Magurran & Seghers 1990) suggested that predator inspection is dangerous. Yet it has only recently been demonstrated experimentally that inspectors incur a deadly risk (Milinski et al. 1997) . Pairs of fish that jointly inspect the predator benefit from risk dilution even if one lags behind the other at a short distance (Milinski et al. 1997) . Since information, i.e. the potential benefit from predator inspection (Magurran 1990; Pitcher 1992) , may be gained by observing inspectors from a distance (Magurran & Higham 1988) , each fish may be tempted to stay back and let the other approach the predator. It is thus possible that pairs of inspecting fish are caught in a 'prisoner's dilemma' (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Milinski 1987 ) and each makes its further approach conditional on the other's continued following (Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1988 Dugatkin , 1991 Milinski et al. 1990a; Dugatkin & Alfieri 1991) . Do fish that jointly inspect a predator in pairs (see, for example, Milinski et al. 1990b) in some way cooperatively 'negotiate' the share of the risk that each takes, or can the coordinated approach they show be generated if each behaves selfishly?
The present paper constructs a model of risk for two inspecting fish at different distances from a predator, using the data from experiments described in Milinski et al. (1997) . We then use this model of risks to investigate optimal strategies of inspection for a single fish, two fish behaving selfishly, and two fish behaving cooperatively. The predictions are then compared with the observed behaviour of inspecting sticklebacks.
RISKS AND DISTANCES
A recent series of experiments has simulated the predation risk of stickleback pairs or singletons 'inspecting' a live pike. Details are given elsewhere (Milinski et al. 1997) , but in summary: either singletons or pairs of dead sticklebacks, Gasterosteus aculeatus, were made to approach a hungry pike, Esox lucius, by remote control according to an algorithm that mimicked natural inspection. The following conclusions were generated: (i) predation risk of both single inspectors and parallel inspecting pairs increased with closer inspection distances; (ii) a member of an inspecting pair had only about half the risk of that of a single inspector; (iii) in pairs, a companion diluted the lead fish's risk of being caught depending on its distance behind the leader: the absolute risk difference between leader and follower was greatest for close inspection distances and decreased further away from the predator; (iv) the leader's relative risk increased with its distance ahead of the laggard; (v) however, for a given distance between leader and laggard, the relative risks of the two fish remained similar with distance from the predator.
In the following analysis, best fits to models were derived using the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm from the software package proFit. The risk to a given single stickleback increases as it gets closer to the pike, and the risk to each of two inspecting fish equidistant from the pike appears to be half that of a single fish, so that the sum of the two risks is the same as that of the single fish (figure 1a, see also Milinski et al. 1997) . With two inspectors, Milinski et al. (1997) showed that the risk falls most intensely upon the leading fish (i.e. fish 1, the one which is closer to the predator). Remarkably, we find a further conclusion: (vi) the sum of the two risks for the two inspectors is again the same as that for a single stickleback at the same distance from the pike as the leading inspector (figure 1b).
Thus the data from all the experiments can be compounded to describe the summed risk as a function solely of the distance, D 1 , of the leading (or single) fish from the predator (figure 1c). This gives the best predictive equation for the summed risk from all the compounded data:
where a = 1.065, b = 0.0180 (see legend to figure 1 for standard deviations). Note that beyond a distance of D 1 > a/b there is no risk to the inspecting fish (p = 0); this 'no-risk' distance occurs just below 60 cm. We next consider how this summed linear risk is allocated between the leading fish and the following fish. A suitable model must define how this risk must be divided between the two fish, in such a way as to obey all the conclusions (i)-(vi) listed above. Calling the distance between the two fish δ (= D 2 − D 1 ) cm, Figure 1 . Summed probability of capture of inspecting sticklebacks in relation to inspection distance of the leading fish, D1 cm from the pike. (a) Risk for a single fish (filled squares, continuous line; p = 1.177 ± 0.112 − 0.0186 ± 0.002 91D1), and the summed risk for two sticklebacks equidistant from the pike (open squares, broken line; p = 1.152 ± 0.102 − 0.0217 ± 0.002 55D1). (b) Summed risk (fish 1 plus fish 2) for two fish at three distances (δ cm) apart: δ = 2.5 (squares, continuous line); p = 1.089 ± 0.089 − 0.0182 ± 0.002 73D1; δ = 5.0 (circles, dotted line); p = 0.869 ± 0.106 − 0.0150 ± 0.002 76D1; δ = 7.5 (diamonds, broken line); p = 1.054 ± 0.163 − 0.0173 ± 0.00423D1. (c) The average total risk (summed for both fish) for all five sets of data in (a) and (b). It is a better compounded result than the one on the first graph, and has: p = 1.065 ± 0.062 − 0.0180 ± 0.0016D1. The ± values throughout are standard deviations (not standard errors).
we therefore modelled the risks as for fish 1,
for fish 2,
in which D 1 is the distance of fish 1 from the pike, and c is a constant which scales the deviation in risk above or below 0.5 for the leading and following fish. Note that (2) above has the desired properties that the total risk depends only on the distance of the leading fish from the pike; the risk differential between the leader and the follower is set by the distance apart, which also involves the distance of the following fish from the pike. The summed risk is constant and independent of the distance apart, and the risk of the leading fish relative to that of the following fish is constant whatever the distance of the leading fish from the pike if the distance between the inspectors is held constant. Further, the observed risk relationships appear linear with distance from the pike (see figure 1 ). Equation (2) is therefore a fair definition of risks for the stickleback-pike system. We fixed the parameters a and b as the best fit values from (1), and calculated from each data set the best fit value for cδ in (2 a), (2 b) above. This gives seven data points (six from figure 2, and one from data in figure 1 where δ = 0). Each value for cδ has a standard deviation. These cδ values are plotted against δ in figure 2a , which shows the best-fit straight line (taking account of the standard deviations, and constrained to pass through zero). The slope of this line gives c = 0.0445±0.006 54. Figure 2b shows how the risks are allocated to the two fish using equations (2 a) and (2 b) above, with c = 0.0445.
OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR A SINGLE FISH
Having derived equation (2), which describes the risks faced by inspecting fish in relation to the distance, D 1 , of the leading fish from the pike, and the distance behind it, δ, of the following fish, we now proceed to investigate optimal strategies under various assumptions. First, we assume that benefits are gained from predator inspection. These probably relate to more efficient future foraging, and improved predator avoidance. We assume that these benefits B increase as D decreases (more information is gained, and hence greater benefits ensue, as the inspecting fish gets closer to the predator), though as yet we have no empirical evidence for such a relationship. The gradient of the function B(D) is therefore negative. We further assume that the benefits of inspection decline exponentially with the distance from the pike that the stickleback completes inspection:
where k, g, are positive constants. The form of B(D) is shown in figure 3a . As g increases, the benefit from inspection drops more sharply with distance from the pike, increasing the value of closer inspection. A linear decreasing version of B(D) was also investigated; it generated quantitatively similar conclusions to the exponential form. We first derive the optimal strategy for a single inspector, using subscript 's' to define notation for this case. Fitness is assumed to be the product of benefits of inspection and survival probability:
We maximize W s by setting dW s /dD s = 0, subject to d 2 W s /dD 2 s < 0, to ensure that this is a maximum. This gives the result,
where the prime denotes the differential coefficient of the function B or p with respect to D s . Since these two slopes are both negative, both sides of (2) are positive. Equation (2) specifies the single prey fish's optimal inspection distance, D * s , from the pike. Substituting (2) and (3) into (5), we obtain
Thus the optimal inspection distance for a single prey fish moves closer to the predator as g increases (see figure 3b ). 
ESS STRATEGIES FOR TWO FISH
How will the optimum (equation (5) Note that for simplicity (but see Magurran & Higham 1988) , we assume that the benefits from inspection are not dependent on the presence or position of another fish, so that B(D 1 ) and B(D 2 ) are the same as B(D s ).
(a) A cooperative optimum
Suppose that two fish behave entirely cooperatively. For evolution to favour such a solution would require some process such as reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) , in which the same pair repeatedly inspect predators together. There is evidence that schools are not random associations of fish, and alliances between individuals appear to form (Chivers et al. 1995; Dugatkin & Sih 1995; Van Havre & FitzGerald 1988) . We assume that the fish behave so as to maximize W c , the summed fitness of fish 1 and fish 2. Thus
What is the optimal distance apart for two fish behaving cooperatively, δ * , so as to maximize W c ? Setting ∂W c /∂δ = 0, we obtain the result
in which the prime denotes the differential coefficient with respect to δ. From the data analysis, the risks p 1 , p 2 , are specified as in equations (2 a) and (2 b), and benefits are assumed to follow equation (1). Substituting into equation (8), we obtain
which can be satisfied only if D 1 = D 2 , i.e. the optimal distance apart is δ * = 0. This being so, we call the distance from the pike D c (= D 1 = D 2 ), and set ∂W c /∂D c = 0 to obtain D * c , the optimal distance for two fish behaving cooperatively. This is
Equation (9) implies that two fish behaving cooperatively should move much closer to the pike than a single fish (cf. equation (6)). This difference is quite notable (see figure 3c ). Unlike the case for the single fish, the benefit constant, g, must lie within a very narrow range (roughly 0.01-0.02) to permit an intermediate optimum (i.e. between D * c = 0, which involves one of the two fish being taken by the predator, and D * c ≈ 60, which involves no risk to either fish). The narrow range, and the fact that it can pay for one fish to be killed, seem to make the present model counter-intuitive, but the implications that two fish behaving cooperatively can have a stable optimal inspection distance closer to the pike than a single fish seems noteworthy. Suppose that each fish behaves selfishly and moves in such a way as to maximize its personal fitness. We seek a pair of inspection distances which are the best replies in the sense that neither fish can profit by deviating. Following equation (4), the fitness of fish i is
Explicitly, where the distance separating the two fish
where 1, 0, 2 implies that the focal fish i is the leader, equidistant from the pike or the follower. These equations allow us to calculate the best reply of fish i to any given distance from the predator, D j , played by its opponent, j. The results are quite complex (figure 4) and are explained in detail later: in summary, when j is further away from the pike than distance D f (the 'far threshold'), the best reply for i is to swim to some position ahead of j. When j is closer to the pike than D n (the 'near threshold'), the best reply for i is to move to a position behind j. If opponent j is situated between the two thresholds, i's best reply is to move to the same distance from the pike as j.
We therefore call the region between the far and near thresholds the 'match zone'. If we envisage the interaction between the two fish as a sequential game of best replies after one fish takes an initial lead into risk, then both fish will eventually end up in the match zone equidistant from the pike. Once one fish enters this zone, the other must match and the best reply is then to stay in the same place: matching is an ESS in that neither fish can profit from deviating and the two fish remain bound to that spot to receive the pay-offs (inspection benefits and risk of capture). As before, for equal fish there is no ESS pair of strategies in which one is closer to the predator than the other (see Appendix 1).
Thresholds D f and D n can be calculated as follows. In the match zone, neither fish can deviate by a marginal change in position. When fish i and j are together (δ = 0), to prevent i moving forward requires that dW i (1)/dD 1 < 0, and to prevent i moving backwards requires that dW i (2)/dD 2 < 0. These conditions give
Figure 5a plots thresholds D f and D n in relation to increasing g (the parameter which increases benefits of inspection; see figure 3a ). The thresholds differ by distance (2c + g) −1 , so that the width of the match zone reduces as the benefits of inspection become stronger. Fish behaving non-cooperatively should inspect at some point from within the match zone (see below), and this non-cooperative solution overlaps with the optimum for single fish at intermediate values of g, and with the cooperative optimum at low g. Fish behaving non-cooperatively benefit from the dilution effect, and hence can move closer to the pike than single fish.
Three examples of non-cooperative behaviour are shown in figure 4 . Because of their complexity, best replies are presented differently from those of Chase (1980) and Houston & Davies (1995) . The thin diagonal line represents equal distances from the pike for i and j, and the thick line is i's best reply distance to opponent j. If the best reply is below the diagonal, i goes to some point ahead of j, and if it is above, i takes a position behind j. The match zones lie between the two vertical lines; here the best reply (the thick line between the two solid circles) is to equal j's bid, i.e. to reply along the diagonal line.
In figure 4a , the benefits of inspection are very high (g = 0.1) so that the match zone is almost adjacent to the pike. If j chooses any distance further than about 31 cm from the predator, the best reply is to play the optimum for the single fish (13.6 cm). Effectively, i does best to ignore the fact that j exists and to behave as if it were independent. The best reply over this range is shown as the line between the two solid diamonds; it corresponds (see arrow) to the open circle on the diagonal line of equal distances for i and j. If j chooses a distance between the match zone and 31 cm, the best reply is to move ahead of j.
The dynamics of the sequential game can be deduced by 'rebounding' successively from the diagonal-each rebound (e.g. see the two arrows) corresponds to the best reply of a given player to the previous move of the opponent. The result in this case is that the two fish move forward in progressively smaller steps to the far threshold (filled circle farthest from the pike). Some form of cooperation may be required for further movement (see below).
In figure 4b , the benefits of inspection are intermediate (g = 0.05) and the match zone is further from the pike. The single fish optimum now lies within the match zone (open circle). If j chooses any distance of more than about 43 cm from the predator, i acts independently and plays this optimum (23.6 cm); j's best reply is then to match. Cooperation may be required for further movement (see below). If j chooses some distance between the match zone and 43 cm, i moves ahead of j, but not as far as the match zone, and again the fish move forward by decreasing steps to the far threshold (filled circle farthest from the pike). However, if (hypothetically) j were to choose some point closer to the pike than the near threshold (filled circle nearest to the pike), i's best reply is to move to some position behind j, but ahead of the match zone. There would then follow best replies in decreasing steps back to the near threshold for inspection.
Finally, in figure 4c , the benefits of inspection are low (g = 0.02) and the match zone is moved even further from the pike. The single fish optimum (open circle) lies behind the match zone. If (hypothetically) j chooses any distance behind the match zone, the two fish reach the far threshold by decreasing steps. There is no point in this range where it pays to behave independently by choosing the single fish optimum as in figure 4a , b. Any move of j into the match zone is responded to with matching. If j chooses a distance between the pike and about 34 cm, i's best reply is to adopt a position 11.2 cm behind j. This best response represents the 'no-risk' boundary for i, and runs parallel to the diagonal line; it ensures that i is just far enough away to gain maximum benefit from inspection without any risk (all risk falls on j). Between the distances shown by the first two open diamonds closest to the pike, each move takes a fish back towards the match zone in 22.4 (= 2 × 11.2) cm steps, until the best reply lies between the second and third open diamonds, when the best reply is to enter the match zone, where any further movement may require cooperation (see below). Figure 5b shows the fitness achieved by each best reply, assuming that inspection occurs without further movement. Note that fitness always increases the closer the opponent j is to the pike, apart from those best replies where i inspects at the single fish optimum (the line between the filled diamonds). Only those best replies within the match zones (vertical lines) are candidates for stable inspection distances. These have neutral stability in the sense that if either fish moves unilaterally to a different point in the match zone, its opponent should match. Figure 5b shows that the highest fitness would be achieved if both fish moved to the near threshold. Knowing that its opponent must subsequently match, it therefore pays either fish to move to the near threshold. At this point both fish gain highest fitness without it paying either to deviate. Provided that no risk occurs before inspection takes place, this solution is a non-cooperative ESS. However, if there is any risk during the dynamics of movement, such a solution would require some cooperation to achieve, since any unilateral forward movement within the match zone would sustain an immediate risk. Thus movement into the match zone will be achieved by purely selfish behaviour, but movement within the match zone towards the near threshold may require some cooperation unless the two fish move forward exactly synchronously.
DISCUSSION
The present analysis is based on the experimentally determined predation risk of inspection to various distances by both single fish and pairs with various distances between leader and follower presented in the companion paper (Milinski et al. 1997) specifically for the stickleback-pike system. However, in principle we believe that the approach is generally applicable to most inspection behaviour (Pitcher et al. 1986; Magurran & Pitcher 1987; Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1988 Dugatkin , 1991 Magurran 1990; Magurran & Seghers 1990; Milinski et al. 1990a, b; Dugatkin & Alfieri 1991; Külling & Milinski 1992; Pitcher 1992) and other cases of approaching danger (Regelmann & Curio 1986; FitzGibbon 1994; Heinsohn & Packer 1995) .
Although it is likely that the benefits of inspecting a detected predator consist of obtaining information about the pending risk (Magurran & Girling 1986; Pitcher et al. 1986; Magurran 1990; Pitcher 1992; Murphy & Pitcher 1997) , no experimental data on the benefits of inspection with respect to distance from the predator exist. Such experimental data are badly needed. We assumed that benefits increase exponentially with proximity to the predator to various extents. Our analysis suggests that an optimal inspection distance can exist for a single fish and for two equal fish behaving entirely cooperatively. The latter should inspect at an equal distance from the pike but much closer (about 30 body lengths when benefits are low) than a single fish. However, optimal inspection for two equal fish behaving extremely cooperatively so as to maximize the fitness of the pair operates across a rather narrow band of conditions relating to the benefits of cooperation, at least with exponentially decreasing benefits with inspection distance.
Stable inspection distances exist for pairs of equal fish behaving non-cooperatively in such a way that each acts to make a best reply (in terms of its personal fitness) to its opponent's strategy. However, the dynamics of the interaction between the fish is very complex, although we have made some simplifying (and to some extent unrealistic) assumptions: both fish have equal costs and benefits at a given inspection distance, i.e. there are no asymmetries; benefits from inspection are not dependent on the presence or position of another fish (although minnows have been shown to receive benefits from observing inspectors (Magurran & Higham 1988) ).
We discuss here only the main results. Non-cooperative pairs of equal fish should also inspect at an equal distance from the pike. Unlike the 'single-fish' and 'cooperative' optima, there exists no unique optimal inspection distance. Approaching the predator can be divided into different distinct phases: if benefits from inspection are high (they increase steeply close to the pike) there is a short 'match zone' (in the range of one to a few body lengths long) which is closer to the pike than the optimum inspection distance for single fish ( figure 4a) . If the opponent is not closer to the pike than some critical distance into the range of risk, the inspector would proceed straight to the optimum for single fish as if the opponent does not exist. If the opponent is closer than this critical distance, the inspector's best reply would be to proceed to some point ahead of the opponent and then the two fish would alternate in taking the leader position, thereby passing the optimum for single fish until they reach the boundary (the far threshold) of the match zone where they stop. There is no selfish way to approach closer. Across the match zone, if either fish chooses to move, the best reply of its opponent is to match (move exactly alongside). Unilateral movement within the match zone may not be possible without some cooperation, but (for example) if the two fish can 'agree' to move forward synchronously, maintaining equal distance to the predator, which is beneficial to both at cost to neither, inspection will occur at the near threshold. This is an ESS, and is about three body lengths closer to the pike than the single fish optimum-pairs behaving almost selfishly (with a kind of weak cooperation) can thus attain greater benefits from inspection by the protection gained from Hamilton's dilution effect.
If benefits from inspection are low (figure 4c) the match zone is longer but quite far away from the predator, and it again lies ahead of the optimum for single fish. To inspect the predator more closely than the near point of the match zone, some kind of strong cooperation is necessary (to reach the cooperative optimum). If the benefits of inspection are intermediate (figure 4b), the match zone is at an intermediate distance from the pike with the optimum inspection distance for single fish within the zone. In this case only a few centimetres can be gained by proceeding with weak cooperation to the near point of the match zone. Closer approach would require strong cooperation.
That pairs should inspect more closely than single fish conforms with empirical findings: single inspectors have been shown to approach the predator less closely than pairs (e.g. Pitcher et al. 1986; Pitcher 1992) . However, it is not yet possible to analyse quantitatively whether pairs are conforming to the cooperative or non-cooperative ESS. We stress that the conclusion for the cooperative ESS relies on the assumption that the two fish behave entirely cooperatively so as to maximize the fitness of the cooperating pair. There may be other forms of cooperation which may have different solutions. An interesting aspect of both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions is that two fish of equal risk proneness should be equidistant from the pike so that neither sustains greater risk than the other.
Are there any data that conform with the predictions of the model? Exact matching between two 'fish' occurred in an experiment in which a companion stickleback was simulated with a parallel mirror (Milinski 1987; see Dugatkin (1988) for a similar study). Of course, the mirror fish matched exactly with the inspecting experimental fish. It is suggestive that the difference in the average inspection distance between sticklebacks with parallel mirrors and fish with oblique (not cooperating) mirrors was about the length of the match zone predicted here. Exact matching by pairs of sticklebacks occurs, however, rarely (M.M., personal observation). This synchronous behaviour would be compatible with the analytical results if the two fish have entered the match zone. In natural inspections, one fish typically takes the role of leader and the other that of the follower (Milinski et al. 1990b; Dugatkin 1991) ; these roles may change for a given pair of inspectors between inspection visits. The conditional approach strategy suggested by the mirror experiments (Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1988 ) and by dummy experiments (Huntingford et al. 1994) , is rather obvious under more natural conditions and depicts some tension within the pair: in inspecting pairs of guppies (Poecilia reticulata) the lead fish swims back with a higher probability than the trailing fish; once a lead fish (A) swims back as far, but not farther than the position of B, then 68% of the time fish A waits for fish B to swim forward before it (A) swims forward (Dugatkin 1991) .
Consistent leaders and followers are not predicted by the models, which suggest that two equal fish should inspect at an equal distance from the pike. For unequal inspectors, it seems intuitively appealing that the weaker inspector (i.e. the one at greater risk) will forage in the following role so that the risks become more balanced between the two fish. It would be interesting to know if anything equivalent to the match zone exists when the two fish are not equal. If benefits from inspection are dependent on the presence or position of another fish (Magurran & Higham 1988) , i.e. a trailing fish has higher benefits than just from its own inspection distance, which is a necessary condition for a 'prisoner's dilemma' of joint inspection (Milinski 1987) , the dynamics of the game may become even more complex. Further investigation of the problem of asymmetric risks and benefits is currently in progress. It might help to understand other puzzling behaviour in the face of deadly risk such as leader-laggard strategies in African lions, Panthera leo, (Heinsohn & Packer 1995) and the universal mobbing behaviour in birds (Regelmann & Curio 1986) . Such interactions are commonplace: the present approach may provide the beginnings of a general evolutionary interpretation.
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APPENDIX 1. CAN EQUAL FISH INSPECT SELFISHLY AT DIFFERENT DISTANCES?
We demonstrate that for equal fish there is no ESS pair of inspection distances such that D * 1 < D * 2 , where D * 1 is the ESS distance from the pike of the leading fish and D * 2 is the ESS distance of the following fish. If such an ESS exists we must solve the analogue of equation (5) simultaneously for fish 1 and fish 2. Thus
where the primes refer to the differential coefficient with respect to D i , where i is the focal fish. To find the best inspection distance for the leading fish given that the following fish is distance D 2 away from the pike, we set i = 1, j = 2 and differentiate equation (13) 
It is not possible to solve equations (14) and (15) simultaneously, since this would require that:
and since we know that D * 1 cannot exceed the maximum permitted distance (i.e. D * 1 < a/b), we see that equation (16) 
